藍花楹創作獎成果展覽

藍花楹創作獎在過往合校前,是陽明校區的校級獎項,分為文學獎及攝影獎,過去兩屆藍花楹文學獎的小說首獎,都代表學校進入印刻舉辦的超新星文學獎競賽,從全國大專院校小說首獎中脫穎而出,足以顯現我們的學生,擁有相當豐沛的創作能量。

自從2021年合校以來,這個校級比賽延續以「藍花楹創作獎」來命名。每年的作品決選,都會邀請文壇、攝影界及影視界資深專業人士進行縝密評選,今年的作品已經選出,邀請大家一起來看展!

📅展期:2024. 03.09(六) – 4.12(五)
📍地點:陽明交通大學 陽明校區 知行樓1F藝空間
📖現場可免費索取精裝作品集 歡迎各界人士蒞臨指導 
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從故宮的龍舟圖群出發淺談界畫的內涵

端午節將至,本次演講邀請到國立故宮博物院書畫文獻處的蔡君彝助理研究員,以台北故院所收藏的龍舟競渡圖群為中心,帶大家看紙上的龍舟比賽。她將介紹與圖群相關的中國界畫(建築圖繪)及風俗畫的概念,並且兼論這兩類圖像被拿來和現實世界互相參照的傾向。

講題:想像的真實:從故宮的龍舟圖群出發淺談界畫的內涵
講者:蔡君彝(國立故宮博物院書畫文獻處 助理研究員)
主持人:黃桂瑩(國立陽明交通大學視覺文化研究所 副教授兼所長)
時間:113年4月12日(五)下午1:20-3:20
地點:知行樓後棟322會議室(陽明校區)

(詳細地圖資訊可參考下方連結:https://ymmap.ga.nycu.edu.tw

Properties and Qualitative Parts

【112學年度心哲所春季心智系列講座】
Our third 2024 Spring Research Seminar talk is on March 22 (Fri) 15:30-17:20. Information about this talk:
Speaker: Dr. Hsuan-Chih Lin (https://web-en.scu.edu.tw/philos/teacher_resume/954)
Time & Place: March 22 (Fri) 15:30-17:20, ZhiXing Building Room 321, Yang Ming campus in Taipei City,
National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University
Format: In English
Title: Properties and Qualitative Parts

Abstract:
It is relatively common to say that objects have parts, although the kinds of parts involved may vary. To begin with, it seems natural to say that the desk in the office has distinct spatial parts, and a perdurantist is comfortable saying that John-at-t is a temporal part of John. Are there other kinds of parts? I argue that objects have qualitative parts, as tropes. More specifically, given that Socrates is a philosopher, it would not be too far-fetched to say that being a philosopher is a qualitative part of Socrates. The account of properties developed in this paper belongs to mereological nominalism, the view that properties are fusions of some nominalist-friendly entities, and that instantiation is explained in terms of parthood. However, mereological nominalism suffers from several serious problems, such as the Co-Extension problem and the Inheritance problem. This is why it has remained underdeveloped for quite some time. In this paper, I shall develop an account of qualitative parts as tropes and demonstrate that it not only solves these problems but also provides a fruitful understanding of the mereological structure of properties.

科設所演講:談當代台灣疫苗猶豫:為何猶豫?怎麼調查?

講 題:談當代台灣疫苗猶豫:為何猶豫?怎麼調查?

講 者:官晨怡 副教授 (國立臺灣大學健康行為與社區科學研究所)
主持人:陳嘉新 教授兼所長 (國立陽明交通大學科技與社會研究所)
時 間:113年3月29日(五)下午1:00~3:00
地 點:國立陽明交通大學(陽明校區)知行樓2樓201教室

The Epistemological Two-Object View of Kant’s Distinction between Appearances and Things in Themselves

Title: The Epistemological Two-Object View of Kant’s Distinction between Appearances and Things in Themselves

Our fourth 2024 Spring Research Seminar talk is on March 29 (Fri) 15:30-17:20. Information about this talk:
Speaker: Dr. Cheng-Hao Lin 林正昊(https://reurl.cc/L4ykj7)

Time & Place: March 29 (Fri) 15:30-17:20,
ZhiXing Building Room 321, Yang Ming campus in Taipei City, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University
Format: In English

Abstract:
Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves is the most important innovation and controversial part of his first Critique. The most common criticism is that the position of the things in themselves contradicts Kant’s principle of our ignorance of non-sensible objects. The views of contemporary Kant scholars who defend him can be roughly divided into three categories to interpret this distinction: the epistemological one-object (two aspects) view, the metaphysical one-object (two kinds of property) view, and the metaphysical two-object view. In this paper, I point out that none of these interpretations successfully resolves the interpretive dilemma: the epistemological one-object view as much as cancels the things in themselves and does not correspond to the text, while the metaphysical one- and two-object views cannot save the principle of ignorance. Therefore, I propose an epistemological two-object view that has not been seriously considered before. This view takes things in themselves to be putative objects that are distinct from appearances, but only for epistemological purposes. It corresponds to the text in that the concept of things in themselves is only a problematic and limiting concept and does not exceed the boundary of cognition for Kant.